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Management Compensation in Switzerland: Say-on-Pay Votes, 
Bonus Bans, and Salary Caps
VALENTIN JENTSCH*
Abstract
This article discusses two rather recent developments concerning the regulation of 
managerial compensation in Switzerland: the Swiss voters’ acceptance of the initia-
tive “against abusive remunerations” on 3 March 2013 and the Swiss voters’ rejection 
of the so-called 1:12 initiative on 24 November 2013. Many international commenta-
tors have argued that Switzerland has imposed one of the most restrictive manager 
pay regimes of the world and has therefore become a much less attractive place to do 
business. In my article, I challenge this view by closely examining the relevant rules 
on say-on-pay votes, bonus bans, and salary caps. I conclude that the new Swiss rules 
on management compensation are not as interventionist as they are sometimes thought 
to be and Switzerland’s liberal economic spirit and dedication to free market eco-
nomic ideals is still alive and well.
Introduction
Management compensation is a hotly debated topic today. Throughout the world, 
lawmakers and regulators as well as the general public have discussed and debated 
this issue. Many countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Swit-
zerland have adopted new rules and regulations on this matter.1 The new Swiss rules 
on management compensation have attracted particular interest, as they are perceived 
as one of the most restrictive say-on-pay regimes in the world and also for other rea-
sons said to turn Switzerland into a less attractive business hub.2 It is therefore worth 
looking more closely at the actual economic effect of the Swiss rules governing man-
* Attorney at law in Zurich. This article is dedicated to my beloved father.
1 The United States mainly rely on disclosure rules on executive compensation, but recently intro-
duced advisory say-on-pay votes. Having in place advisory say-on-pay votes for about ten years, the 
United Kingdom shifted towards a binding say-on-pay regime and adopted further disclosure rules on 
directors’ pay more recently. Switzerland recently adopted a binding say-on-pay regime, certain bonus 
bans, and transparency improvements on management compensation, but clearly rejects any form of 
salary caps, including CEO to worker pay ratios.
2 See for example John Revill, Swiss to Vote on Executive Pay, http://online.wsj.com/news/arti
cles/SB10001424127887324103504578372203886463598 (accessed 25 June 2015) or Neil MacLucas, 
Should Swiss CEO Pay Be Capped? A Vote May Make It So, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10
001424052702304868404579191542062955968 (accessed 25 June 2015).
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agement compensation, while putting those rules into comparative perspective on an 
international level.
Current international interest in Switzerland’s regulatory policy is due in part to 
the fact that the Swiss voters were asked to vote on management compensation twice 
in 2013. First, the then accepted3 and adopted4 popular initiative “against abusive 
remunerations”, which applies to all Swiss public companies, provides for a binding 
say-on-pay regime, certain bonus bans, more transparency on executive loans, and 
criminal penalties for violations of these regulations. Secondly, the shortly afterwards 
rejected5 1:12 initiative, which would apply to all Swiss companies, attempted to 
adopt a relative salary cap into Swiss law based on the idea that no one in a company 
should earn more in a month than others in a year. These two initiatives express 
similar concerns about the often very high salaries of top managers of Swiss compa-
nies. Nevertheless, these two initiatives could not be more different in principle. The 
initiative “against abusive remunerations”, initiated by a CEO of a small family busi-
ness who later on became a member of the Swiss Parliament, unambiguously espouses 
a shareholder value approach.6 In contrast, the 1:12 initiative, brought and promoted 
by the Young Socialist Party, is inspired by socialist ideals such as the distribution 
of wealth amongst members society through relative wage equality.7
In this article, I will argue that the new Swiss rules on management compensation 
are not as interventionist8 as often believed; despite these rules, Switzerland’s busi-
ness environment still expresses a liberal9 spirit that promotes international business 
with and from Switzerland. In making this argument, I will examine how manager 
pay is regulated in Switzerland and evaluate how restrictive the new rules are. For 
this purpose, my analysis focusses on three major building blocks of management 
compensation: the regulation of say-on-pay votes, bonus bans, and salary caps. As I 
will further discuss in the remainder of this article, Switzerland has adopted binding 
3 The initiative “against abusive remunerations”, BBl 2577 (2008) was accepted by the Swiss vot-
ers with an overwhelming majority of 68 percent and all 26 Cantons on 3 March  2013.
4 On 3 March 2013, the Swiss Constitution was amended by a new provision, which contains 
a mandate to the legislator to regulate Swiss public companies in accordance with certain principles 
set forth by the initiative (Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999, SR 101, 
art. 95 para. 3) (the “Swiss Constitution”). On 20 November 2013, the Swiss Federal Council published 
the corresponding implementing legislation, the Ordinance against Excessive Compensation in Public 
Companies, AS 2519 (2013) (the “Swiss Compensation Ordinance”), which will become effective as 
of 1 January 2014.
5 The 1:12 initiative, BBl 3725 (2011) was rejected by a 65 percent majority of Swiss voters and 
all 26 Cantons on 24 November 2013.
6 The introductory phrase of art. 95 para. 3 of the Swiss Constitution describes the purpose of the 
new rules as protecting “the economy, private property, and shareholders” and guaranteeing “sustain-
able corporate governance”.
7 See the Report of the Swiss Federal Council to the Swiss Parliament regarding the 1:12 initia-
tive, dated 18 January 2012, BBl 637 (2012), at 642–644.
8 The term “interventionist” refers to economic interventionism, which in general favors interven-
tions in the market in the public interest on behalf of the government.
9 The term “liberal” refers to economic liberalism, which is generally opposed to government 
interventions in the free market.
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say-on-pay votes and selective bonus bans under the initiative “against abusive remu-
nerations”, but no salary caps as demanded by the 1:12 initiative and other reform 
proposals.
Binding Say-on-Pay Votes
The most important element of the new Swiss rules on management compensation is 
undoubtedly the establishment of a binding say-on-pay regime. According to the new 
rules, shareholders vote on the total compensation of the board of directors, the 
executive board, and the advisory board (if any), but not on individual pay of each 
director or officer.10 The new rules, however, do not provide a default rule for how 
the say-on-pay regime shall be implemented in each publicly held company.11 In fact, 
the law imposes only three minimum requirements for such votes: say-on-pay votes 
must occur on a yearly basis; must address the total compensation of the board of 
directors and the executive board; and must have a binding effect.12 The new rules 
are thus very flexible, allowing the companies’ bylaws to regulate most details of such 
votes.13 In this context, the bylaws must define the nature of the say-on-pay vote and 
the voting mechanism and may further define the consequences of a no vote.
A first item of required bylaws content is the nature of the say-on-pay vote.14 The 
main issue in this area is whether the shareholders’ vote qualifies as an approval or a 
resolution. This is important because the latter but not the former gives shareholders 
a right to submit motions, allowing them not only to ratify the total director and offi-
cer compensation, but also to submit their own proposals in relation to these compen-
sation packages. Leading scholars15 and practitioners16 have argued that there are 
good reasons to opt for an approval rather than a resolution. Should a company still 
choose to provide for a shareholders’ right to submit motions, the company’s bylaws 
have to specify more closely the applicable procedure.
A second item of required bylaws content is the voting mechanism.17 Retrospec-
tive voting18 allows shareholders to take into account a manager’s performance dur-
10 Swiss Constitution, art. 95 para. 3 (a); Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 18 para. 1.
11 An earlier draft of the implementing legislation provided for a default rule, see Preliminary 
Draft to the Ordinance “against abusive remunerations”, published 16 June 2013, art. 18 para. 1 (the 
“Primarily Draft”).
12 Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 18 para. 3.
13 Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 18 para. 2.
14 Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 12 para. 1 no. 4.
15 Hans Caspar von der Crone & Adriano R Huber, Festlegung von Vergütungen in Publikumsge-
sellschaften 109 SJZ 297, 302 (2013).
16 Ralph Malacrida & Till Spillmann, Corporate Governance im Interregnum 8 GESKR 485, 488–
499 (2013).
17 Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 12 para. 1 no. 4.
18 In a retrospective voting system, shareholders at their annual meeting vote on total director and 
officer compensation of a reference period (such as the one year period since the last annual share-
holders’ meeting or the last business year, which is at the same time the reporting period) in the past.
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ing the preceding year. However, retrospective voting poses managers at risk of not 
receiving their normally expected compensation due to shareholder veto power.19 
Prospective voting20 assures managers that their compensation is not blocked by 
shareholders before delivering their services to the company. However, prospective 
voting makes it impossible for shareholders to reward performance in advance 
because management already knows what it will earn in the upcoming year. A mixed 
system combines elements of both retrospective and prospective voting.21 Such a 
system might mitigate but cannot eliminate the described problems of retrospective 
and prospective voting. In all systems, companies thus face a tradeoff between the 
interests of the shareholders (reduction of agency costs due to proper performance 
incentives for management) and the managers (predictable salaries and bonuses). It 
is up to the company to decide which system suits best to their needs.22
The regulation of the consequences of a no vote is an item of permitted bylaws 
content.23 Unlike in an earlier draft,24 the new rules do not require the company to 
call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting within a certain time. As suggested in the 
legislative report,25 the company’s bylaws could allow the board to make a new 
motion to the shareholders at the same meeting. However, this could have adverse 
effects because it induces the board generally to propose the highest possible amount.26 
Another option would be to call another shareholders’ meeting within a certain time 
in order to hold a new vote. However, this is not very practical since the convocation 
of another shareholders’ meeting is very costly for any public company. It is therefore 
arguably the best approach for the company to amend the bylaws to vote on any 
unauthorized compensation packages in the next annual shareholders’ meeting. The 
downside of this approach is that it exposes management to a high degree of uncer-
tainty whether or not their compensation packages will eventually go through.27
19 While such a system provides more effective performance incentives, there is reason to believe 
that it ultimately leads to even higher management pay since managers will demand an additional risk 
premium for the uncertainty they face. There is reason to believe that the risk premium is considerably 
high since managers have undiversified invested their whole human capital and typically also a large 
part of their real capital in the firm.
20 In a prospective voting system, shareholders vote on director and officer compensation of the 
ongoing (time period until the next annual shareholders’ meeting or the current business year) or a future 
(one fiscal year starting on July 1 after the shareholders’ meeting) reference period.
21 For example, such a system might contain prospective non-variable pay votes and retrospective 
variable pay votes.
22 For current market trends, see Homburger, Final Ordinance Against Excessive Compensation 
Published, http://www.homburger.ch/aktuell/aktuell/bulletins (accessed 25 June 2015) or Bär & Karrer, 
Minder Rules in their Final Form Published Today, http://www.baerkarrer.ch/publications-en/briefings.
html (accessed 25 June 2015).
23 Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 12 para. 2 no. 6.
24 See Primarily Draft, art. 18 para. 2.
25 Federal Office of Justice, Supplementary Report to the Swiss Compensation Ordinance, dated 
8 October 2013, 9–10 (the “Supplementary Report”).
26 See Stefan Knobloch, Ist die Initiative ‘gegen die Abzockerei’ umsetzbar? 7 GESKR 372, 375–377 
(2012).
27 From a policy perspective, it is most likely that such a rule will increase management compen-
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The Swiss rules are not necessarily more stringent on say-on-pay than the U.S. and 
U.K. regulations.28 Since 2011, the U.S. rules require at least every three years an 
advisory vote about the compensation of the top five executive officers.29 Under these 
rules, shareholders further have to vote at least every six years on whether they wish 
annual, biannual, or triennial say-on-pay votes. The United Kingdom has already 
implemented advisory votes on the remuneration policy report in 2002.30 The new 
U.K. rules, as in effect since 1 October 2013, require a binding shareholder vote on 
the remuneration policy report and separate advisory votes on the individual compen-
sation of executive and non-executive directors.31
As all these statements and observations illustrate, the new Swiss rules on say-on-
pay are flexible in many respects. The new law’s moderate restrictions enable Swiss 
public companies to choose their favored regulatory regime according to their own 
needs and wishes. Moreover, the Swiss rules are not considerably stricter than com-
parable U.S. and U.K. rules. The object of the vote (global vs. individual compensa-
tion) is much narrower defined under the Swiss rules. There is further no significant 
difference between an advisory and a binding say-on-pay vote because public com-
panies’ boards cannot ignore either of them. It is thus not accurate to denote the Swiss 
say-on-pay votes as one of the strictest of the world.
sation since managers will demand an additional risk premium for this uncertainty (see also fn 19). In 
the worst case scenario, managers might also decide to quit their jobs, which most often is not in the 
best interest of the company.
28 For a rough overview on say-on-pay in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Lillian 
Tsu et al., Say-on-Pay in the U.S. and U.K., http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/
say-on-pay (accessed 25 June 2015).
29 See sect. 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) (requiring companies to approve the compensation 
of executives as disclosed in the annual financial statement and the aggregate total amount of compen-
sation that may be paid to an executive officer related to an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or asset 
sale); see also sect. 229.402 (item 402) of the Code of Federal Regulations, 17 CFR 229.402 (2011) 
(requiring companies to disclose all compensation of the CEO, the CFO, and the three additional most 
highly compensated executive officers).
30 See sect. 241A of the Companies Act (1985), as amended by the Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations of 2002, S.I. 2002/1986, which was adopted as sect. 439 of the Companies Act (2006) 
(requiring companies to give shareholders a right to an advisory vote on the remuneration report); see 
also sect. 420 and sect. 421 of the Companies Act (2006) (requiring companies to publish a report on 
directors’ remuneration as part of the annual reporting cycle and making provision for the Secretary of 
State to regulate what should be in the remuneration report) and Schedule 8 of the Large and Medium-
sized Companies and Groups Regulations of 2008, S.I. 2008/410 (setting out what must be included in 
the remuneration report).
31 See sect. 79–82 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (2013), S.I. 2013/2227 (requiring 
companies to have a directors’ remuneration policy, which must be approved by shareholders at least 
every three years, and to give shareholders a right to approve individual director compensation that is 
inconsistent with that policy); see also the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups Regulations 
of 2013, S.I. 2013/1981 (prescribing the requirements of the directors’ remuneration policy and setting 
out the minimum requirements of the directors’ remuneration policy) and the Companies Act (2006) 
Regulations of 2013, S.I. 2013/1970 (requiring certain companies to prepare a stand-alone strategic 
report as part of their annual report).
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Selective Bonus Bans
Another important element of the new Swiss rules on management compensation is 
its various bans on bonuses for the board of directors and executive board members. 
The new Swiss rules essentially prohibit three specific types of bonuses for directors 
and officers: severance payments, advance payments, and commission payments in 
relation to takeovers and restructurings.32 The Swiss rules do not prohibit anything 
other than these three types of bonuses.
Under the new Swiss rules, severance payments are no longer permissible. The 
term “severance payments” includes all contractual and bylaw-based payments, but 
excludes all severance payments guaranteed by Swiss33 and foreign statutory law. 
This new rule does, however, not clearly distinguish between unlawful severance 
payments and compensation related to non-compete agreements.34 Furthermore, it 
enables the company to extend the duration of employment contracts or notice periods 
under existing contracts to a certain degree, which could in theory have a similar 
effect to severance payments.35 This rule thus gives public companies at least some 
room for interpretation.
The new Swiss rules also outlaw advance payments, defined as any payment given 
to a manager before that manager actually performs any services for the company. 
The scope of this prohibition, however, is rather limited. A typical situation in which 
such payments can become relevant is when a company facing possible bankruptcy 
wants to hire a top manager to conduct a corporate restructuring.36 While this is a 
rather unusual situation, the more relevant question is whether or not to include sign-
ing bonuses under this rule.37 The authoritative legislative materials have clearly 
negated this question, also because signing bonuses ensure a competitive managerial 
labor market by facilitating job changes.38 In light of this exemption, one can argue 
that again, this new rule is not nearly as restrictive as it might appear.
Additionally, the new Swiss rules restrict commissions paid after takeovers and 
restructurings within corporate affiliates. The scope of this rule is very narrow: it only 
32 Swiss Constitution, art. 95 sect. 3 (b); Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 20.
33 See for example Swiss Code of Obligations of 30 March 1911, SR 220, art. 339b–339d.
34 The most recent example of a highly compensated non-compete agreement is the agreement 
between Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical company, and Daniel Vasella, its former CEO, providing 
for total compensation in the amount of CHF 72 million (currently equivalent to USD 69 million), which 
was ultimately cancelled in early 2013.
35 However, both the maximum duration and notice periods of employment agreements can be no 
longer than one year under the new rules (see Swiss Compensation Ordinance, art. 12 para. 1).
36 The best known example of such an advance payment was the CHF 12 million (currently equiva-
lent to USD 11 million) advance payment made to Mario Corti, then CEO of national carrier Swissair, 
only a few months before the company filed for bankruptcy in late 2001. This financial scandal was 
eventually the initial trigger for the initiative “against abusive remunerations”.
37 A signing bonus compensates a manager for forfeited compensation elements due to the job 
change.
38 Federal Office of Justice, Explanatory Report to the Swiss Compensation Ordinance, dated 
14 June 2013, 25–26 (the “Explanatory Report”); Supplementary Report, 12.
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pertains to commissions paid during intragroup takeovers and restructurings.39 The 
payment of commissions on such restructurings is further only forbidden if it is paid 
in relation to one specific transaction.40 The compensation committee can thus still 
honor directors’ and officers’ extraordinary achievements during such restructurings 
by setting the variable compensation for the business year accordingly.41 Once again, 
the new law’s prohibition on paying commissions during intragroup takeovers and 
restructurings is not nearly as restrictive as it appears.
While there are no bonus bans covering all these types of bonuses in the United 
States or the United Kingdom, both countries have adopted rules prohibiting certain 
bonuses, in particular severance payments, if the company received bailout money 
from the government (and the taxpayers, respectively).42 Despite sound economic 
rationales for severance payments in theory,43 actual compensation practices regard-
ing these payments have generated much skepticism about them. The same is true for 
advance payments and commission payments in relation to takeovers and restructur-
ings. It is therefore not unlikely to assume that other countries will follow the Swiss 
approach on bonus bans.
At first glance, the aforementioned rules banning certain bonuses appear quite 
interventionist. After all, generally speaking, a prohibition is the strongest form of 
market intervention. However, examining them more closely reveals that these pro-
hibitions are narrowly construed and thus provide room for liberal interpretation. 
Indeed, this seems to be intended by the legislator, since the primary purpose of the 
bill is to strengthen corporate governance under a shareholder value approach. More-
over, other countries have adopted similar restrictions on bonuses and there is a con-
tinuing trend that several other countries are at least considering to implement more 
extensive bonus bans.
39 See Supplementary Report, 12.
40 See Explanatory Report, 26.
41 This is important because such payments can provide involuntarily resigning directors and offi-
cers with important incentives to continue acting in the best interest of the company until their resigna-
tion becomes effective. It sometimes can be difficult to motivate these persons in the face of a highly 
probable job loss.
42 See sec. 7001 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009), amending the executive compensation provisions of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, which established requirements applicable to participants in the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (“TARP”) (prohibiting TARP recipient companies from making any golden parachute payment 
to a senior executive officer during the period the company is receiving financial assistance under the 
TARP remains outstanding). Similar constraints on severance payments had been introduced under the 
U.K. bank rescue package of 2008, under which participating banks had to sign up an agreement with 
the Financial Services Authority to restrict executive pay.
43 From an economic point of view, banning severance payments is counterproductive, since these 
payments serve to mitigate top earners’ job loss risk. Without severance payments, manager pay will 
likely rise, because managers will demand higher total compensation as an alternative means of job 
loss risk mitigation. This is especially true in today’s managerial labor market, which is characterized 
by high CEO turnover rates.
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No Salary Caps
Salary caps on executive compensation come in various forms. An absolute salary 
cap puts a money amount on the maximum amount a manager may earn in a year, as 
seen in the compensation of some professional sports players.44 Relative salary caps, 
on the other hand, can take different forms. For example, one type of relative salary 
cap focuses on wage spreads, requiring a certain coefficient between the highest and 
the lowest wage within a company. The Swiss 1:12 initiative is an example of such 
a total pay ratio. Another relative salary cap are variable pay ratios. Such salary caps 
require a certain coefficient between non-variable pay and bonuses, as seen in the 
financial sector salary caps that the European Union is currently implementing. Swit-
zerland has considered all three types of salary caps but the Swiss legislator, includ-
ing the electorate, has rejected each and every one of them.45
Back in 2000, a member of the Swiss Parliament brought a parliamentary initiative 
before the Swiss Federal Council to create an absolute salary cap of CHF 1 million 
(approximately equivalent to USD 1 million) for all directors and officers of Swiss 
companies.46 However, the Swiss Parliament struck down the initiative on 11 March 
2002. The main argument against this and other absolute salary caps is that such a 
rule is arbitrary and dangerous, since it can lead to a strong misalignment of interests.47 
No similar proposal has been made since, which supports the proposition that the 
Swiss uphold liberal values.
The paramount example of a relative salary cap focusing on wage spread is the 
1:12 initiative. The 1:12 initiative attempts to ensure that no one within a Swiss com-
pany shall earn less in a year than any person within the same company earns in a 
month. In order to guarantee this wage equilibrium, the 1:12 initiative proposed a new 
constitutional provision48 that limited the highest wage paid within a company to no 
more than twelve times the lowest wage with the same company. Nevertheless, on 
24 November 2013, 65 percent of the Swiss voters and all Cantons rejected this 
proposal,49 which provides clear and up-to-date evidence that Switzerland and its 
people are opposed to stringent economic regulation and still possess rather liberal 
notions of the government’s interference in private business relationships.
44 Several major U.S. sports leagues, including the NHL, the NFL, and the NBA, have imple-
mented salary caps as both a method of keeping overall costs down and as a means of ensuring parity 
between teams.
45 For an overview, see Olivier Blanc & Florian Zihler, Die neuen aktienrechtlichen Vergütungsre-
geln gemäss dem Entwurf vom 5. Dezember 2008 4 GESKR 66, 82 (2009).
46 Parliamentary initiative 00.439, Prohibition of Excessive Salaries, submitted by Flavio Maspoli 
on 26 September 2000.
47 Absolute salary caps signal to the corresponding person that future increases in performance are 
not worthwhile since additional efforts are not rewarded, see for example Daniel Leu, Variable Vergü-
tungen für Manager und Verwaltungsräte, 292–293 (Schulthess 2005).
48 Swiss Constitution, art. 110a (not entered into force).
49 See for example James Shotter, Swiss Voters Reject Wage Caps in Referendum, http://www.ft. 
com/intl/cms/s/0/bbf51592-5512-11e3-86bc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ngDE.DAoW (accessed 25 June 
2015).
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The Swiss have also considered adopting a relative salary cap focusing on a vari-
able pay ratio. During the four-and-a-half years of parliamentary debate about the 
initiative “against abusive remunerations”, the Swiss Parliament discussed and ulti-
mately rejected a statutory provision that stipulates a variable pay ratio.50 Some also 
proposed requiring Swiss companies to establish their own variable pay ratio within 
their bylaws or include such a ratio in the compensation report as an integral part of 
their annual report rather than fixing a rigid number in the statute.51 Nevertheless, 
the fact that none of these proposals ultimately succeeded further indicates the Swiss 
people’s continued commitment to liberal economic policy.
In contrast, the regulatory environment of the United States and the United King-
dom is more recently strongly in favor of relative salary caps. On 18 September 2013, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed a new rule regarding the 
CEO versus average worker pay.52 Although the Commission does not dictate a rigid 
total pay ratio, but instead plans to implement a corresponding disclosure rule,53 the 
floor is now open to discuss further rules in this area. In addition, the United Kingdom 
faces even more severe regulations. Initiated by the European Banking Authority, 
current E.U. initiatives are about to impose rather strict relative salary caps for the 
financial services industry in the near future. The new E.U. rules restrict bankers’ 
bonuses to 100 percent of their base salary, although bonuses may be enlarged to 
200 percent of the base salary with explicit shareholder approval.54 The E.U. Parlia-
ment passed this bonus cap in April 2013, but its practical implementation by the 
Member States is still ongoing and not yet completed. In this context, it is further 
worth noting that the United Kingdom launched a legal challenge against these plans 
to cap bankers’ bonuses on 20 September 2013, which was eventually withdrawn on 
21 November 2014.55
Switzerland’s position on salary caps, arguably the most significant restriction on 
management compensation, demonstrates strong commitment to liberal values. The 
Swiss legislator and electorate have routinely rejected any salary cap, whether in 
absolute or relative terms. In contrast, new regulations on salary caps are about to be 
implemented in the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, one could argue 
that Swiss dedication to economic liberalism gives Switzerland an important com-
50 This rule was proposed as part of the counterproposal to the initiative “against abusive remunera-
tions” which the Swiss voters voted and rejected alongside the general initiative (which was approved) 
on 3 March 2013.
51 Franziska Bächler, Vergütungen von Verwaltungsräten und Geschäftsleitungsmitgliedern in Ban-
ken, 195 (Schulthess 2012).
52 Securities and Exchange Commission, Pay Ratio Disclosure, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2013/33-9452.pdf (accessed 25 June 2015).
53 Under the mandate of sect. 953 (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission proposes to amend 
Item 402 of Regulation S-K.
54 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013, art. 94.
55 See Tom Fairless & Ainsley Thomson, U.K. Files Suit at EU’s Top Court Over Banker Bonus 
Cap, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304526204579.097153885902932 
(accessed 25 June 2015).
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petitive advantage over other major financial centers, including the City of London, 
if the E.U. bankers’ bonus cap becomes effective.
Conclusion
The new Swiss rules on management compensation are not as interventionist as they 
may at first appear. First, while the Swiss say-on-pay regime is binding, its imple-
mentation is nevertheless very flexible and can be tailored to companies’ specific 
needs and concerns. In addition, the Swiss say-on-pay votes are arguably more lenient 
than those of the United States or the United Kingdom. Secondly, the new Swiss rules’ 
bans on bonuses are quite selective and narrowly construed. Therefore, those rules 
are not much more restrictive than the applicable U.S. and U.K. regulations. Thirdly, 
Switzerland has not adopted salary caps of any kind. By comparison, it is not unlikely 
that both the United States and the United Kingdom will adopt salary caps in one 
form or the other over the next few years. Analyzing the Swiss legal framework 
towards these three building blocks of management compensation regulation – not 
only as such, but also from an international perspective – reveals that the liberal spirit 
is still alive in corporate Switzerland.
